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1Energy Governance in South Korea: 
Long-Term National Energy Master Plans since 1997
Introduction
Energy, as backbone of economic growth and public welfare, as well as contributor to 
enhancing or mitigating climate change, is one of the most pressing policy issues for 
many countries. Overall, national-level energy sector reforms in many countries have 
been modest without a long-term low-carbon policy framework or coherent set of policies 
(Gunningham, 2012). 
It might be due to several characteristics of energy. Energy, as a ‘polycentric’ and 
‘mega-issue,’ is inextricably interlinked, vertically and horizontally, with many other 
sectors and their actors, such as industry, trade, national security, transportation, 
environment, urban development, and finance (Lesage, Graaf, & Westphal, 2010; Ostrom, 
2010). However, energy has been somewhat obscure area left to its own technical experts 
operating mostly within the conventional realm of energy security and supply
(Gunningham, 2012). Governments tend to protect their citizens against energy price 
fluctuations in fossil fuels or keep energy prices low to earn domestic political support 
(Dansie, Lanteigne, & Overland, 2010; Goldthau & Sovacool, 2012). Another dimension 
of energy lies in its path dependency and inertia. Human life and socio-economic activity 
is so deeply embedded in and dependent on energy that the mutual feedback loop between 
individual choices and the energy system is reinforced (Goldthau & Sovacool, 2012). 
Power system, for example, show strong path dependencies of “carbon lock-in” due to 
the large investments perpetuating a mostly fossil fuel based system of electricity 
production and consumption (Goldthau & Sovacool, 2012). And alternative options, 
despite higher performance or lower costs, remain ‘locked-out’ due to vested interests 
(Markusson & Haszeldine, 2009). Thus, institutional legacies protect status quo 
(Goldthau & Sovacool, 2012). These challenging characteristics of energy make energy 
policymaking fragmented and inconsistent with very little coordination between most of 
relevant actors and make necessary energy reform at most modest. 
Thus, a daunting but important question is which forms of energy governance (i.e., 
how to make energy policies with whom) will be more effective in formulating better
sustainable energy policies, given expert-oriented and fragmented policy-making and the 
path dependence and inertia of the prevalent energy systems and their infrastructure, 
rooted in vested interests of socio-economic entities. Could diverse stakeholders 
collaborate effectively for sustainable energy policy-making, or necessary energy sector 
reform? 
The next chapter discusses briefly two models that explain policy changes through
collaboration or conflict: consensus-based regulatory negotiation, and conflict expansion. 
Then, this paper intends to analyze how governance for national energy policymaking in 
South Korea (hereafter Korea) has been evolved and to identify which model explains 
Korean energy governance better. Finally, this paper evaluates current energy governance 
in Korea and suggests how it should evolve again.
Consensus-based regulatory negotiation, and conflict expansion
2For very complex regulatory decisions with multi-parties, multi-issues, consensus-based 
regulatory negotiation has been suggested as a way for sustainable decision-making by 
many scholars and practitioners (Freemand & Langbein, 2000; Harter, 2000; Susskind & 
McMahon, 1985;Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). They argue that if some conditions are 
met, such as inclusion of a full range of stakeholders, fair process management, and some 
procedural safeguards mandated by administrative laws, then stakeholders including 
regulatory agencies can negotiate and generate a win-win sustainable agreement. 
However, some critics contend that there are potential pitfalls in consensus-based 
regulatory negotiation, such as erosion of state authority, insufficient representation of 
the public interest, administrative incompetence, regulatory imprecision, increased time 
and expense, the lowest-common denominator problem, generation of new sources of 
conflict, or cooptation by powerful conveners due to political inequality (Amy, 1987;
Coglianes, 2001; Rose-Ackerman, 1994; Rossi, 1997; Werhan, 1996). 
Other theorists and commentators on policy change models argue that policy changes 
or reforms are outcomes of conflict rather than collaboration. Cobb and Elder (1983) 
suggest that systems of limited participation where powerful economic interests are able 
to insulate from the influence of large-scale democratic forces through the creation of so-
called ‘iron-triangle’ are highly resistant to change. In many countries, such systems of 
limited participation, such as tobacco, pesticides, air and water pollution, airlines, 
trucking, telecommunications, and nuclear power, have been dramatically altered or 
destroyed (Bosso, 1987; Campbell, 1988; Derthick & Quirk, 1985; Fritschler, 1989; Jones, 
1975). Baumgarter and Jones (1991) explain how such systems could be altered by 
describing how political actors lobby for a change in the roster of participants involved 
by seeking out the most favorable venue for the consideration of that issue. When the 
venue for public policy making changes, those who previously dominated the policy 
process may find themselves in the minority, and erstwhile losers may be transformed 
into winners (Baumgarter & Jones, 1991). 
Creating a new and favorable, institutional venue can be viewed as a political process. 
Schattschneider (1960)’s concept of conflict expansion explains that losers in a policy 
debate have a motive to change the roster of participants by appealing to those not 
currently involved. If they can appeal to the right groups, they may be able to change their 
losing position into a winning one, as more people become involved in the debate on their 
side. This model of conflict expansion may explain well how difficult policy changes 
may happen through very political processes in reality.
The first model of multi-party consensus building through regulatory negotiation may 
be better and ideal model for policy change or necessary reform as long as all the 
important stakeholders are motivated to participate, find the best solutions, and build trust. 
However, this kind of consensus building may tend to bring out more adaptive, gradual 
policy change rather than abrupt, radical policy changes. 
The second model of conflict expansion for policy change may describe the reality of 
policy change better. But, policy reform or changes in this model are more likely to 
produce winners or losers through political conflict and more susceptible to political 
changes.
Evolution of Korean energy governance 
3Closed network of strong central government and government experts (1961-19921)
Korea had achieved rapid economic growth under strong military government regimes 
since 1961 until 1987. Despite no oil reserves in Korea importing nearly all of its oil 
needs, the government had provided inexpensive energy stably and efficiently by building 
centrally coordinated institutions, such as powerful laws facilitating energy generation 
and transportation, regulatory agencies, government think-tank, and public corporations, 
in a relatively short time. Energy mix in Korea had been diversified to include liquefied 
national gas (LNG) and nuclear energy (Kim, 2007).
Key feature of energy governance during these years is a closed system where central 
ministries of energy, commerce, and trade dominated decision-making, working closely 
with experts from government think tank, such as Korea Energy Economics Institute 
(KEEI). The strong government could control energy price strategically and politically to 
supply cheap oils and electricity for industries, transportation and households. While 
there were consultation process, such as public hearings and coordination with other 
ministries and industries, citizen participation did not exist in national energy 
policymaking. Citizens and civil societies, such as environmental non-government 
organizations, had mostly focused on environmental issues from siting controversies 
around energy facilities, such as power plants and nuclear waste management facilities 
since late 1980s. And since early 1990s civil societies became interested in energy issues 
with the conjunctions of climate change and had accumulated expertise on energy issues
(Kim, 2007). 
Governance for the first national energy master plan (1997 - 2006)
Still closed system but reform within
The government in the mid-1990s identified several problems of Korean energy system 
that had mainly focused on supply side of energy and expansion of quantity rather than 
quality of energy through excessive governmental regulation and intervention. Low 
energy price maintained through government control caused had encouraged excessive 
energy consumption, decreased competitiveness of energy sector, and discouraged 
necessary investment in the energy sector. Despite diversification of energy sources, the 
dependence on imported oil out of total primary energy increased from 48.2% in 1985 to 
62.5% in 1995, due to increased number of vehicles and demand from expanded industry 
sector, hence weakened national energy security. Energy intensity (Energy/GDP, TOE/ 
1,000 US $ as in 1990) of Korea in 1995 was 0.418, relatively much higher than those of 
other advanced countries, such as Japan (0.144), England (0.194), Germany (0.189), 
France (0.175), and U.S. (0.335), which indicated that energy was not being used 
efficiently in Korea (MTI, 1997). 
                                  
1 In 1993, President Kim, Young-Sam became the first president in decades without a military background 
and tried to make structural reform in ways to reduce government control and introduce market-based 
mechanism, such as privatization of energy public corporations and introduce market-based mechanisms 
for energy price system.
4However, policies for energy efficiency were not integrated effectively with 
relevant sectors, such as industry, transportation, and urban planning due to lack of 
regulatory system for more comprehensive, systematic, integrated long-term planning. 
Without fundamental or basic law for energy planning, there were many individual laws 
for each energy source, such as electricity, petroleum, city gas, as well as different laws 
for supply side and demand side respectively. Also, since 1992, when international 
discussion on climate change was culminated into United Nations Framework 
Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC), national energy policies should be 
incorporated with global environmental concerns (MTI, 1997).
Thus, as an preliminary step toward a basic law for energy in Korea, the government 
amended the existing Rational Energy Utilization Act (REUA) in January, 1995 so that
the article 4 of the REUA defined the first National Energy Master Plan (NEMP). 
According to the article 4, the government should establish the NEMP every five year for 
the next ten years. The NEMP, as the upstream energy plan, provides principles and 
directions for downstream energy policies by integrating and coordinating all relevant 
sectors systematically 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) requested the KEEI in 1996 to formulate 
a proposal for the first NEMP. Then, the MTI put out the proposal through public hearing, 
coordination with other ministries, consultation with energy industries sequentially and 
passed the consulted version to the cabinet meeting for final review. In 1997, the cabinet 
approved and the MTI announced the first NEMP for the years from 1997 to 2006.
Figure 1. Governance for the first NEMP (1997 - 2006)
Governance for the second NEMP (2002 – 2011) 
Crack in closed system and entrance of environmental NGOs 
During the five years since the first NEMP, Korea experienced major economic and 
political transformation. First, Korea was hit severely by financial crisis in 1998 and 
underwent structural adjustment in the corporate and financial sectors, which were 
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5also lowered total energy demand outlook compared to that of the first NEMP. Another 
major change was a political one. President Kim, Dae-Jung who, had been a long-time 
opposition leader to authoritarian governments, was elected in December, 1997, which 
marked a peaceful power transfer from dominant party to another for the first time since 
1961. Consolidating democracy since the end of the authoritarian era engendered the 
mushrooming of voluntary civic associations and all varieties of social and cultural 
movements (Koo, 1993). Kim Dae-Jung administration actively engaged and closely 
collaborated with civil society groups as partners, incorporating their opinions in the 
policy-making process (Fiori & Kim, 2018). For example, President Kim, Dae-Jung 
established a presidential advisory committee, called ‘Presidential Commission on 
Sustainable Development (PCSD)’ in September, 2000 where many leaders in major 
environmental NGOS in Korea were appointed as its members. 
After five years from the first NEMP announced in 1997 according to the article 4 of 
REUA, the MTI prepared in 2001 for the second NEMP for the next ten years (2002-
2011). Under this political atmosphere, governance for the second NEMP started to 
change slowly with participation of civil society for the first time in energy policy 
decision making, which cracked closed decision-making system. The MTI asked the 
KEEI to formulate the proposal for the second NEMP. Then, the MTI and the KEEI 
orchestrated extensive consultation with 150 experts and stakeholders in order to develop 
a report, called ‘2010 Energy Vision: Direction and Strategies for Energy Policy.’ The 
participants in joint study included government officials from the MTI, experts from 
public corporations for energy sectors, government think tanks, energy-related private 
sectors, and professors (in the fields of engineering, resources, economics) from 
universities. During this consultation period, other ministries including the Ministry of 
Environment (MOE) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) did not participate and no civil 
society members were not involved. 
Then, the director for resource policy in the MTI had an advisory meeting with several 
experts for the commissioned report of 2010 Energy Vision on September 6, 2002. The 
Minister of Trade and Industry convened a strategic meeting for ‘development of energy 
industry’ on September 19, 2002. In that meeting, eight government officials from the 
MTI, eleven officials from public corporations in energy sector, four representatives from 
oil, gas, and other energy industries, five experts from government think tanks, and four 
professors from universities. All the experts in that meeting had backgrounds of electric 
engineering, chemical engineering, industrial engineering, resource economics, and 
economics. Then, the MTI finalized its proposal for the second NEMP on October 22, 
2002 and circulated it to other ministries and energy industries for consultation 
(November 22, 2002). Until this step of decision-making process, there was no 
involvement of general citizens and civil society members. 
However, new venue for civil society to influence energy decision-making was created 
via the PCSD. The presidential decree on the PCSD was amended on June 3, 2002 in a 
way to strengthen its power by mandating the PCSD to review all the major public policy 
or long-term plans that have implications for sustainable development before those 
policies or plans are finalized (Dong-a Ilbo, 2001.9.20). And according to the new decrees, 
the MTI should give the opinions from the PCSD higher priority in its decision for the 
second NEMP, and the PCSD could monitor the MTI and make a report directly to the 
president. 
The PCSD established a sub-committee for energy policy in 2000, where government 
6officials, energy industry, professors, and civil society members from environmental 
NGOs and consumer movement organizations participated. The sub-committee decided 
to focus on energy efficiency and energy saving as the first agenda for deliberation 
(November 1, 2000). The activity of energy sub-committee was not based on the MTI’s 
NEMP but on relatively independent self-study for learning about energy issues. The 
seminar topics included energy price system, energy efficiency, energy technology, 
energy demand and supply policies, nuclear energy, and renewable energy. The energy 
subcommittee ended up with its own report on sustainable energy system on August 20, 
2002, which was independent from the second NEMP. Although the PCSD could review 
and make comments on the final version of NEMP proposal, it would be very difficult to 
change main contents of the proposal since any member of the PCSD had not been 
involved in formulating the proposal itself from the beginning. It is not certain, though, 
how the review of the PCSD could make any impact on the final proposal of the second 
NEMP. On December 10, 2002, the second NEMP was finalized through the final review 
and approval of the cabinet meeting. It took one year and seven months from May, 2001 
to December, 2002 for the second NEMP to be born and finalized as the official long-
term national energy plan. 
In terms of contents, the second NEMP was different from that of the first NEMP in 
three main aspects. First, the second NEMP emphasized market-based policies rather than 
government-led command-and-control policies. Second, it put more priority on demand-
management policies rather than supply-centered policies. Third, it introduced the 
concept of sustainable energy system. 
Figure 2. Governance for the second NEMP (2001. 5 ~ 2002. 12)

























7Succeeding Kim Dae-Jung administration, Roh Moo-Hyun, a human rights lawyer who 
had fought all his life against authoritarianism, was elected as a president in December 
2002 with enthusiastic support from relatively younger generations who wanted to create 
a participatory democracy. President Roh even named his administration as ‘participatory 
government.’ The relationships between progressive civil groups and the government 
were consolidated and enhanced as the government tried to make reforms in various 
progressive agendas. Consequently, many prominent civic group leaders followed 
President Roh to the Blue House and joined the administration. Their involvement was 
not limited to government posts. Participation in special government committees and task 
force teams became the norm (Fiori and Kim, 2018). 
Right after the new administration started in early 2003. President Roh asked the 
PCSD to review current sustainable energy system in South Korea and report its 
suggestion to him. The PCSD where many environmental civic group leaders participated 
proposed at the end of 2003 to the president that 1) agenda for the energy policy should 
be expanded toward more upstream issues, 2) energy policies should be made based on 
social consensus through deliberation, and 3) public participation in energy policy making 
should be increased (Kim, 2007). 
At the same time, environmental civic groups tried to enact a new law in order to 
change current energy governance into one that incorporates a new paradigm of 
sustainable development and empowers civil society more. The government collaborated 
with the civic groups and proposed a new law, called ‘the Framework Act on Energy 
(FAE)’ and the law was enacted in March, 2006 (Kim, 2007). The new law was intended 
to coordinate 28 individual laws related to energy sources and functions coherently and 
systematically. Also, the Energy Master Plan (EMP) should be made every five year for 
twenty year planning time frame. 
And more importantly, the FAE enhanced energy issue into national agenda by 
establishing ‘the National Energy Advisory Commission (NEAC)’ where total 25 
members of government officials from relevant ministries, energy experts, 
representatives from energy industries and civic organizations reviewed, deliberated and 
approved national long-term energy planning. In other words, the principal decision 
making agency was changed from the Ministry of Industry and Resource (MIR) to the 
President since the chairperson of the NEAC was the president. Among 25 members of 
the NEAC, more than five members should be recommended by civic groups. These 
changes appear to be influenced by civic groups who participated in various venues for 
energy policy making and believed that current energy governance should be transformed 
from the closed network between the government and energy industries that had focused 
more on energy provision and had been locked in anti-democratic and anti-environment 
path (Kim, 2007). In June, 2006, civic groups created a coalition group, called ‘Citizens’ 
Coalition for Energy (CCE),’ aimed at exerting more influence on energy policy making. 
Governance for the 1st Energy Master Plan (EMP)2 (2006. 2 ~ 2008. 8)
                                  
2 The third national energy master plan (2008) is called as the first Energy Master Plan since the plan was 
established by the first foundational law on energy, the Framework Act on Energy (2006). 
8As the key government think tank for energy policy, the KEEI prepared a proposal for the 
1st EMP since June 2006. And in November 28, 2006, the 1st NEAC was organized and 
convened officially for the first time. Nine government members of the NEAC included 
the President as the chairperson, the Prime Minister as the vice chairperson, seven 
ministers from the Ministry of Industry and Resources, the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation and 
the Ministry of Strategy and Budget. Sixteen members from non-governmental 
institutions include eleven experts in the field of energy and five members who were 
recommended from civil society (Table 1). 
Table 1. Sixteen non-governmental members in the first NEAC
Energy experts
Kang, Joo-Myong Professor at Seoul National University (Earth Environment System Engineering)
Kim, Sang-Hee Chairperson of the PCSD
Kim, Tae-You Professor at Seoul National University (Earth Environment System Engineering)
Kim, Hyun-Jin Chief researcher at Samsung Economic Research Institute
Bang, Ki-Yeol President of the KEEI
Lee, Soo-Ho Chairman of the Korea Gas Company
Choi, Ik-Soo President of the Korea Energy Technology Research Institute
Han, Joon-Ho Chairman of the Korea Electric Power Company
Hong, Seong-An Director of Hydrogen Fuel Project, Korea Institute of Science and Technology
Hwang, Doo-Yeol Chairman of Korea Petroleum Company
Hwang, Joo-Ho Professor at Kyung-Hee University (Nuclear engineering)
Members recommended by civic groups
Kim, Yoon-Ja Professor at Han-Sin University (International Economy)
Kim, Il-Joong Joint President of Environmental Justice
Kim, Jae-Ok President of Citizens’ for Consumer Problem 
Lee, Duck-Seong Permanent commissioner of Coalition for Green Consumers 
Lee, Hak-Young General director of national association for YMCA
In the NEAC, four sub-committees were set up to address energy policies, energy 
technologies, resource development, conflict management respectively. All the members 
of the sub-committees were recruited again from outside for more specific and practical 
deliberation. The members of the Sub-Committee for Energy Policies (SCEP) included 
seven government officials from the Ministry of Industry and Resources, the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation and the Ministry of Strategy and Budget, and twelve non-governmental 
experts (Table ).
Table 2. Non-governmental members of the Sub-Committee for Energy Policy
Non-governmental participants 
Bang, Ki-Yeol President of the KEEI (Chairperson of the sub-committee for energy policy)
Park, Hee-Cheon Professor at Inha University (Economics)
Kim, Rae-Hyun Professor and Dean of Graduate School of Energy and Environment, Seoul National 
University of Technology
9Kim, Kyung-Min Professor at Han-Yang University (Political science)
Lee, Ki-Myung Director, Citizens’ Coalition for Energy
Lee, Sang-Hoon Director, Korea Federation for Environmental Movements
Jang, Young-Jin Director, Korea Electric Power Company
Park, Chang-Kyu Director, Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute 
Lee, In-Young Vice chairperson, Korea Energy Agency
Park, Tae-Joo Vice President, Korea Coal Association
Cho, Jae-Song Director, SK Corporation
Kim, Myung-Hwan Director, GS Caltex Corporation
In the inaugural meeting of the NEAC, the Minister of Industry and Resources 
announced ‘the Energy Vision 2030” that had three key directions of energy security, 
energy efficiency and environmental friendliness. While the Energy Vision 2030 was not 
official long-term national energy master plan based on the new FAE, the Energy Vision 
2030 included five visions and concrete targets related to each vision. For example, by 
2030, South Korea’s reliance on foreign energy sources would be reduced from 95.9% 
(in 2005) to 65%. At the same time, the percentage of renewable energy in energy mix 
would be increased from 2.1% (in 2005) to 9% by 2030. The Minister suggested that 
nuclear energy could be an important option to achieve both visions of energy security 
and environmental protection. 
For controversial issues, such as appropriate percentage of nuclear power in energy 
mix, and energy demand forecast, the SCEP planned to convene joint meetings with the 
Sub-Committee for Conflict Management (SCCM).  
Conflict and no consensus
For seven months from May to November 2007, the SCEP and SCCM of the NEAC had 
deliberated on the proposal for the first EMP submitted by the KEEI in March 2007 in 
around ten meetings respectively. In those meetings, there was conflict between the KEEI 
who formulated the proposal and the members from environmental NGOs who raised the 
issue of exaggerated energy demand forecast which was assumed by the KEEI, 
challenged the electricity mix that favored nuclear energy and limited renewable energy, 
and criticized that the proposal put too much focus on electricity generation rather than 
energy efficiency issue in transportation and construction. 
On December 17, 2007, the SCEP and the SCCC convened a joint meeting, aimed at 
building a consensus on controversial agendas about energy demand forecast, 
composition of nuclear energy and renewable energy in electricity mix, and energy 
efficiency policies before the NEAC would hold a public hearing for the first EMP. 
However, members decided that the nuclear energy mix would follow the original 
proposal from the KEEI and other issues would be further discussed. After the first public 
hearing on the proposal for the first EMP on December 21, 2007, the NEAC ended up 
with the same conclusion. 
Since then until May, 2008, the KEEI adjusted their original proposal to change the 
assumption of oil price in energy demand forecast model from 57 US $ to 100 US $. 
Consequently, total primary energy demand by 2030 was reduced from 378.1 million 
TOE to 350.7 million TOE. But, the KEEI increased the contribution of nuclear energy 
as the total primary energy source up to 26~28.9% by 2030. Originally, the KEEI had 
expected that the percentage of nuclear energy in energy mix would peak with 17.7% in 
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2020 and slowly decrease afterwards. During that time, there were no meetings in the 
SCEP and SCCM.
Political change toward less citizen participation
In the meantime, there was a fundamental change in political sphere. In December, 2007, 
Lee, Myung-Bak, a former mayor of Seoul, was elected as the President, which 
transferred political power from progressive parties to a conservative party. Inaugurated 
in February 2008, the Lee Myung-Bak administration distinguished itself from the 
previous progressive governments by emphasizing practicality and pragmatism rather 
than participatory procedures. During its first few years, the close relationships between 
the government and civil societies were dissociated. The government reduced drastically 
the number of committees inside the government where civic group members had played 
consultative and advisory roles. (Fiori and Kim, 2018). This political atmosphere also 
might affect governance for energy policy making since early 2008. 
Deliberation vs. Efficiency
Apart from the lack of consensus on key issues in the proposal for the first EMP between 
the members centered around the KEEI and government and the members from civic 
groups, there was also conflict about decision-making procedures. Facing the deep 
division inside the NEAC, the government decided abruptly to hold an open seminar on 
the proposal for the first EMP instead of open public hearing on June 4, 2008. In the open 
seminar, two parties did not budge at all from their original positions.
While the members of the SCEP and SSCM suggested that more deliberation should 
be needed to finalize the first EMP until December 2008, the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy (the MKE) (new name for the Ministry of Industry and Resource) announced 
the plan to have workshops, seminar, public hearing within a month (July 10 ~ August 
13, 2008) and finalize the first EMP through the NEAC at the end of August, 2008. During 
one month, the NEAC held two workshops where representatives from public 
corporations, government think tanks, and energy industries participated. And another 
two workshops were held only for civil societies. Through the first two workshops, the 
slightly adjusted proposal from the KEEI was endorsed by the participants. However, 
civic groups still criticized the proposal in their workshops. As a consequence, civic 
groups boycotted the second (last) public hearings for the first EMP. 
Final compromise
Through all the consultation and deliberation process, the first EMP was approved by the 
NEAC in August, 2008. The proposal was adjusted one more time during that time to 
change the assumption of oil price in energy demand forecast model from 100 US $ to 
119 US $. Consequently, total primary energy demand by 2030 was reduced from 350.7 
million TOE to 342.8 million TOE. Also, the KEEI increased the contribution of 
renewable energy in energy mix from 8.7% to 11% by 2030. Still, however, civic groups 
criticized the first EMP in several aspects. They believed that energy demand forecast 
used for the first EMP was still exaggerated and there was no political will to increase 
renewable energy in energy mix necessarily enough for energy transition from nuclear 
11
energy and fossil fuels. Above all, they criticized that the decision making procedure for 
the first EMP violated the fundamental principle of the FAE, that is, collaborative 
governance for national energy planning. They argued that their participation in the 
NEAC and other consultative and advisory process was perfunctory and was utilized to 
justify the government decision.
Figure 3. Governance for the first EMP (2006. 2 ~ 2008. 8)
Change of energy law and governance structure in 2010
The Lee Myung-Bak administration upheld ‘low-carbon green growth’ as a new 
economic development paradigm for South Korea since its outset in February 2008, 
stressing clean energy technologies including nuclear energy as engine for economic 
growth. The Lee administration needed an effective governance structure to implement 
the ideal of low-carbon green growth. Thus, in January 2010, the Framework Act on Low-
Carbon Green Growth (FALCGG) was enacted with the purpose of integrating all the 
related but separately regulated policy areas, such as climate change, greenhouse gas 
emission, renewable energy, and sustainable development into coherent legal framework. 
More specifically, the new Act established ‘the Presidential Committee on Green Growth 
(PCGG)’ that would review all the related policies, plans, and strategies for green growth, 
including long-term energy master plan. 
As a consequence, long-term national energy planning should be conducted under the 
FALCGG instead of the FAE. Furthermore, the FAE was scaled back into the Energy Act 
(EA). The changes in the governance structure from the FAE and the EA were apparent. 
First, the NEAC of the FAE was degraded into the Energy Commission (EC) where the 
MKE, not the President became the chairperson of the EC again. Although more than five 
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members of the EC would be high-rank government officials, not the Ministers. The main 
responsibility of the EC would be preliminary review of the EMP. This change of 
governance structure in 2010 implies that the level of decision making for energy policy 
was moved from the President where all the relevant Ministries and civil societies 
participated to the MKE that had dominated energy policy making in the past again. From 
the perspective of civic groups, they lost the venues where they could exert their power 
in decision-making processes. 
Governance for the second EMP (2013. 5 ~ 2014. 1)
The decision-making process for the second EMP started with new administration of 
President Park Geun-Hye who was inaugurated in February, 2013. As President Park 
belonged to the same conservative political party that supported the previous the Lee 
administration, political atmosphere was not much changed surrounding the new 
government. 
However, governance for the second EMP was very different from that of the first EMP. 
The usual process was that once the KEEI had formulated a proposal as a foundation for 
deliberation for EMP, then committee members discussed it to create a government 
proposal for public consultation. However, for the second EMP, the process was upside 
down. Rather than asking the KEEI to do their job, the MKE constructed five ‘Public-
Private Joint Working Groups’ (hereafter, WG) where fifteen members for each WG 
participated to produce a recommendation report to the MKE in May, 2013 so that the 
government could use it as a government proposal for the second EMP (Table ). In each 
WG, ten members came from the government, government think tank, academics, two 
representatives from industries, and two from civic groups. The reason why the MKE 
introduced these WGs from the beginning was not still clear. However, one hypothesis is 
that the government might want to prevent potential conflicts about energy policies by 
incorporating various opinions in earlier steps to design the government proposal. 
Table 3. Five public-private joint WGs (2013. 5 ~ 2013. 10)
Name Topics
WG for coordination Coordinating four WGs to set main directions for the 
second EMP and to review the energy mix
WG for energy demand Demand forecast; target demand based on demand 
management effects; energy pricing policy, etc.
WG for electricity Energy transition; dispersed generation; greenhouse gas 
emissions, etc.
WG for nuclear energy Economic feasibility of nuclear energy; Scenarios of 
nuclear energy generation; nuclear energy policies; 
nuclear energy safety, etc.
WG for renewable energy Targets for renewable energy generation; etc. 
The MKE set up four months (May – August, 2013) for the WGs to produce a 
foundation for the government proposal for the second EMP. One of the hottest issues 
was policy direction for nuclear energy in energy mix. Since all the issues were 
interlinked in energy mix, one uncertainty in nuclear energy policies made other 
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discussions futile. Also, without detailed commissioned report from the KEEI, members 
of the WGs had difficulty in establishing structure for deliberation from the beginning. 
Given the short time frame, they could not have enough time to deliberate all the 
important issues, such as energy security and greenhouse gas emissions. Since, in the 
wake of nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan due to earthquake in 2011, public 
perception of nuclear energy and power plants turned toward negative, members of WGs 
considered public acceptance of nuclear energy. Also, they needed to discuss whether the 
government should extend operational lifetime of nuclear power plants that would be 
terminated within twenty years or whether they government should build more nuclear 
power plants or not. All the important energy decisions were contingent on those 
controversial issues around nuclear energy.
After more than 50 meetings of WGs, the WG finally announced several 
recommendations for the second EMP in October, 2013. First, they recommended that 
the focus of energy policies should be changed from supply management to demand 
management. They argued that electricity price should be increased while energy taxes 
should be reduced for LNG and kerosene. Second, the WGs suggested that electricity 
should be generated in dispersed networks rather than centralized network in order to 
secure stability of electricity generation and to enhance fairness in bearing the costs of 
electricity generation. Third, the ratio of nuclear energy in electricity mix should be 
lowered from 41% set by the first EMP in 2008 to 22 ~ 29%. Fourth, the ratio of 
renewable energy in electricity mix should be maintained as 11%, which was the same 
level set by the first EMP. 
With the recommendations from the WGs, the MKE held two public hearings and ten 
seminars with experts and stakeholders, and three briefing sessions at National Assembly , 
and coordinated with other ministries and government think tank during October and 
December, 2013. And finally, the MKE formulated the government proposal for the 
second EMP that would be reviewed by the EC, the PCGG and the Cabinet meeting 
sequentially. The government proposal announced in December, 2013 by the MKE did 
not end controversy but brought it about again mostly because the proposal adopted 29% 
ratio of nuclear energy in electricity mix which was the maximum number in the range 
that was recommended by the WGs. 
Civic group members, who participated in the WGs, announced official criticism on 
the government proposal for the second EMP in December, 2013 on the grounds that the 
energy demand forecast in the model was still so exaggerated that the government moved 
forward more supply with maximum nuclear energy in electricity mix. They criticized 
the government of ignoring their request 1) to test the model that the KEEI used in 
forecasting energy demand through joint fact-finding, 2) to have public deliberation on 
energy mix and preference on nuclear energy, and 3) to increase the ratio of renewable 
energy in electricity mix up to 15% by 2035. 











Political shift toward a progressive government again and deepened public 
engagement
Abrupt political change in South Korea was made by unexpected impeachment of 
President Park Geun-Hye in March 2017 due to her corruption scandal. In following 
presidential election, Moon, Jae-In, a progressive minority party leader, was elected as 
President and started his government in May, 2017. As a progressive leader, his 
presidential campaign pledges on energy policies were phase-out of nuclear power and 
expansion of renewable energy, which opened a new opportunity to civic groups again to 
influence energy policy-making. Specifically, Moon pledged to stop the construction of 
two nuclear power plants at Shin-Kori where more than 1 billion US dollars had already 
been committed. Nuclear industry sectors and local residents who were supposed to 
receive government compensation fiercely opposed the decision. 
The Moon government utilized a ‘deliberative polling’ method where 471 ordinary 
citizens were randomly but scientifically selected to represent the general public in South 
Korea and were asked to deliberate for thirty three days in October, 2017 and vote on the 
issue of where to stop the construction of the two nuclear reactors with balanced 
information. On October 15, almost 60% of participants in deliberative polling preferred 
to resume construction for economic efficiency. At the same time, 53.2% voted to reduce 
the share of nuclear energy in Korea’s energy mix. Based upon the outcomes from the 
deliberative polls, the government announced that it would resume construction of two 
nuclear power plants but cancel plans to construct six new nuclear power plants in the 
future. Despite many flaws and shortcomings of procedures and outcomes, that effort was 
the first test in South Korea to determine highly technical and complex energy-related 
decisions by involving general citizens beyond civic group’s experts. 
Then, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MTIE) (a new name of the MKE) 
announced sequentially ‘energy transition roadmap’ where the number of nuclear power 
Provides a recommendation 
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plants would be gradually reduced from 24 in 2017 to 18 in 2013, and to 14 in 2038, and 
‘renewable energy 3020’ where the share of renewable energy in electricity mix would 
be increased from 7% in 2017 to 20% in 2030. In following December, 2013, the MTIE 
determined the 8th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand (BPESD) for the next 
fifteen years (2017 ~ 2031) where planned construction of six nuclear power plants would 
be revoked, and life-time of ten old reactors would not be extended. According to the 
BPESD, the share of nuclear power in electricity mix would be reduced to 11.7% by 2031. 
Those government plans made in 2017 were a sharp turn from the second EMP made 
three years ago in 2014. And those plans set the tones for the next third EMP in 2018.
Governance for the third EMP (2018. 3 ~ 2019. 6)
The MTIE adopted a similar governance structure for the third EMP (2019 ~ 2040) where 
a public-private joint working groups would prepare a recommendation report with the 
help of government, mainly the MTIE so that the MTIE could announce the government 
proposal for the third EMP. Government officials from the MTIE and researchers from 
the KEEI participated in all WGs as assistant administrators and facilitators for the 
meetings. Particularly, the KEEI took the role of secretariat for all the commissioned 
research with other government think tanks.
However, there were a few changes in procedures. First, a few themes of working 
groups were changed from those of previous working groups for the second EMP. 
Maintaining WGs for coordination and energy demand management, the MTIE added 
three new WGs for energy supply management, conflict management (communication), 
and Industry (jobs) instead of previous themes of electricity generation, nuclear energy, 
renewable energy in March, 2018. It seemed that the MTIE avoided controversial agendas, 
such as the shares of nuclear power and renewable energy in electricity mix, in the themes 
of WGs since those issues were already sort out in previously announced plans in 2017. 
Second, the WGs for the third EMP had more participants, meetings and deliberation 
period than those of the second EMP WGs. Seventy five participants met more than sixty 
four times for nine months (March ~ November, 2018) while fifty people had about fifty 
meetings for six months (May ~ October, 2013). In terms of composition of members in 
WGs, the share of members from civic groups and private industries increased compared 
to the previous WGs. Many new and young experts were added, replacing conventional 
experts who had participated in many advisory meetings. Third, During their deliberation, 
the WGs had five regional briefings and an interim briefing to present their mission, 
visions, and activities to local governments and stakeholders. 
After the WGs delivered theirs recommendations to the MTIE, it proceeded with 
consultation processes with public hearings, open seminars, other ministries, the EC, the 
Green Growth Commission, and the Cabinet approved the third EMP in its cabinet 
meeting. 
Recommendations from the WGs for the third EMP
The WGs for the third EMP recommended the ‘realization of safe, clean, citizen-
participatory energy system’ as a long-term vision of energy transition policies, which 
would require six main tasks: 1) innovative energy demand management, 2) renewable 
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energy-based, integrated smart energy system, 3) future energy industries, 4) citizen-
participatory, dispersed energy governance, 5) international collaboration for energy and 
resources, 6) infrastructure for the fourth industrial revolution and energy transition. More 
specifically, the WGs recommended that electricity pricing system should be reformed as 
soon as possible and the share of renewable energy in electricity mix should be between 
25 ~ 40% by 2040. Interestingly, the WGs for the third EMP expected that energy demand 
would be decreased according to the forecast model, which indicated that there would be 
less and less necessity to build large-scale energy supply facilities, such as power plants. 
The third EMP (2019 ~ 2040) and criticism
The third EMP, approved at the Cabinet meeting on June 4, 2019, mandated that the share 
of renewable energy in electricity mix would be increased from 7.6% in 2017 up to the 
range between 30 ~ 35% in 2040. However, the third EMP did not specify the shares of 
nuclear energy and coal in electricity mix, but indicated that life-time of old nuclear 
power plants should not be extended and no new nuclear power plants would be 
constructed. The third EMP took the same line with the Moon government’s presidential 
campaign pledge and other governmental plans in 2017 that were aimed at phasing out 
nuclear energy and expanding renewable energy.
After the government announced the third EMP in June, 2019, commentators and 
experts, particularly from nuclear industries, harshly criticized the government on the 
grounds that the EMP was determined politically rather than rationally and the 
government tried to justify the decision with wrong assumptions in the model and in the 
name of participatory governance where civic groups influenced the decision in the WGs. 
For example, the WGs quoted the forecast of International Energy Agency (IEA) that the 
world average share of the renewable energy in electricity mix would be 40% in 2040 as 
the evidence to support the WGs’ recommendation to expand renewable energy in South 
Korea. However, the half of the 40% electricity would be generated from hydro power. 
For South Korea, electricity generated from renewable energy (solar and wind power) 
except hydro-power was only 1.6% in 2017. Thus, they criticized that the government 
target up to 35% in 2040 was unrealistic. More fundamental concerns are about the 
consequence of abrupt changes (within five years) between long-term (twenty years) 
master energy plans on trust of the public and industries on energy policies. Critics 
emphasized that the rationales and logics that the government used in the second EMP 
were replaced with the very opposite ones by the current government. 












It seems that governance for national energy policy making in South Korea has evolved 
gradually from expert-driven, supply-centered, closed system to more participatory, 
demand-considered, open system. While the government used terms ‘participation,’ 
‘consultation’ ‘collaboration’ and ‘governance’ in their decision-making, this paper 
argues that conflict expansion model explains adequately well how Korean governance 
for national energy policy-making has evolved. Closed system of limited participation in 
energy policy-making has been altered by changing rosters of participants in committees 
and working groups and changing venues between the ministry level and presidential 
level based on the ideology or political values of presidents or political parties.
Recently, strategic venue for deliberation expanded to general public when the Moon 
administration asked general public whether to stop or continue construction of two 
nuclear power plants. Proponents for energy transformation argue that governance 
matters in order to curb the path toward more renewable energy and less nuclear power 
and still there are bitter relationships between energy stakeholders including energy 
industry sectors. During the evolution of governance in South Korea, many commentators 
acknowledge that long-term energy planning has been swayed by political changes 
between progressive government and conservation governments rather than based on 
sound and rational evidence or forecast.
Figure 6 and 7 show how the long-term energy plans for nuclear energy and renewable 
energy have fluctuated between the first EMP (2008) and the third EMP (2019). 
Particularly, the change in forecast for nuclear energy is remarkable between the first 
EMP (2008) when the Lee government supported nuclear energy as a clean and economic 
energy sources and the third EMP (2019) when President Moon made a presidential 
campaign pledge to phase-out nuclear power. All the experts panels, working groups, and 
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consultation processes seem to be utilized to justify the political decision that had been 
already made with the input from participants who got in appropriate venues for influence 
strategically.  
Figure 6. Evolution of plans for the share of nuclear energy in energy mix
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Regardless of the outcome being rational or irrational, or right or wrong, current 
governance structure needs to be improved in some aspects. Above all, if political change 
is the most influential factor to make a policy, then long-term plans may be changed
abruptly again by political changes in election, hence no trust on long-term plans. Also, 
all the losers want to be winners again when political windows are open again by 
changing rosters, venues, and models to justify their positions, which is not sustainable. 
General public should be consulted and asked to contribute to energy decision-making 
by the government. But, they should be approached strategically as a winning venue in 
order to belittle or limit specific stakeholders. When general public is involved in energy 
policy-making, which was regarded as the field for only experts and the government, we 
need to overcome some old tension among stereotyping frameworks. Experts has been 
framed as closed, not neutral, rational, or safe. Citizen’s deliberation has been framed as 
irrational, amateur, and dangerous. Industries are greedy, resistant to change, corrupted. 
Environmental groups are radical, irrational, and political. Sustainable development may 
be achieved genuinely when those actors are satisfied with the governance of energy 
policy making as fair and rational, acknowledging other members including general 
public as partners rather than enemies. One potential option for sustainable energy policy-
making may be combination of consensus-based stakeholder negotiations for joint-fact-
finding and public deliberation based on the information generated from the negotiations. 
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